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Recent Decisions
ANTITRUST LAW-SHERMAN ACT-HOME RULE MUNICIPALITIES-
MUNICIPAL ORDINANCES-The United States Supreme Court has
held that a home rule municipality is not exempt from liability
under the Sherman Antitrust Act unless the municipality's action
constitutes an action of the state itself or is municipal action in
furtherance or implementation of a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed state policy to displace competition.
Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
The City of Boulder was organized as a "home rule" municipal-
ity pursuant to the provisions of the constitution of the State of
Colorado, as amended,' and was granted extensive powers to exer-
cise the right of self-government in both local and municipal mat-
ters. The city charter provided that all municipal legislative powers
would be exercised by an elected city council.2 In October, 1964,
the City Council, pursuant to this power, enacted an ordinance
which granted Colorado Televents, Inc., a twenty-year, revocable,
non-exclusive permit to use the public ways in the City of Boulder
to string cables for cable television.2 In 1966, Colorado Televents,
1. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835, 836-37 n.1
(1982). CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 6, provides in pertinent part:
The people of each city or town of this state, having a population of two thousand
inhabitants... are hereby vested with, and they shall always have, power to make,
amend, add to or replace the charter of said city or town, which shall be its organic
law and extend to all its local and municipal matters.
Such charter and the ordinances made pursuant thereto in such matters shall su-
persede within the territorial limits and other jurisdiction of said city or town any law
of the state in conflict therewith ....
It is the intention of this article to grant and confirm to the people of all municipal-
ities coming within its provisions the full right of self-government in both local and
municipal matters ....
The statutes of the state of Colorado so far as applicable, shall continue to apply to
such cities and towns, except insofar as superseded by the charters of such cities and
towns or by ordinance passed pursuant to such charters.
d.
2. 102 S. Ct. at 837. Boulder, Colo., Charter § 11 (1965 rev. ed.).
3. 102 S. Ct. at 837.
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Inc., assigned its rights under the permit to the petitioner, Com-
munity Communications Co., Inc. (CCC).
4
Since that assignment, CCC provided cable television service to
the University Hill area of Boulder, in which approximately twenty
percent of the City's population resided, and where geographical
limitations made traditional television broadcast signals difficult to
receive.' CCC's service was limited because of the quality of cable
television technology available to it at the time. Eventually, how-
ever, the availability of improved technology enabled CCC to ex-
tend better service to its customers and to expand to other areas of
the City."
In May 1979, CCC informed the City Council that it planned to
expand service to other areas of the City.7 A potential competitor,
Boulder Communications Company (BC), which also sought to
enter the City's cable television market, sought a permit to provide
competing cable television service througout the City.8 At that
time the City and its officers undertook an extensive study to re-
consider the cable television business in light of the new develop-
ments in the industry since the enactment of the original
ordinance. 9
At the conclusion of its review, in December 1979, the City is-
sued an emergency ordinance which restricted CCC from ex-
panding its service into other areas for three months. 10 The City
stated that the purpose of the moratorium prohibiting further con-
struction by CCC was to afford other cable television companies
the opportunity to make proposals to the City; the City Council
believed that allowing CCC to continue its construction in other
areas would give it a competitive advantage over other companies
4. Id.
5. Id. See Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035,
1036 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
6. 102 S. Ct. at 837.
7. Id.
8. Id. BCC was a defendant below and a respondent in the instant case. See id. n.4.
9. Id. n.6. The district court in Boulder explained that the City Manager and City
Council initiated a complete review of cable television service due to the many changes in
the industry since the 1964 ordinance. Consultant Robert Sample warned that the City
should be concerned about the tendency of a cable system to become a natural monopoly.
The City Council feared that CCC had an unfair advantage because it already was operating
in Boulder and even though it might not be the best cable operator for Boulder, it would
nonetheless be the only operator because of its head start in the area. The Council wanted
to lessen the advantage of CCC and make it easier for other cable television companies to
make their offers. 485 F. Supp. at 1037.
10. Id. at 838.
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seeking to start service in those areas.1
Petitioner CCC filed suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Colorado,12 seeking a preliminary injunction to pre-
vent the City of Boulder from restricting its expansion and alleging
that such a restriction would violate section one of the Sherman
Antitrust Act.'8 The City asserted a two-fold defense against
CCC's claim that it was violating the Sherman Act, arguing that
the City's ordinance restricting construction was a valid exercise of
the City's police powers, and alternatively, that the City had anti-
trust immunity pursuant to the state action exemption established
in Parker v. Brown."
The district court examined the rights attendant to a grant of
authority to a home rule municipality and found that the Constitu-
tion of Colorado had given Boulder autonomy only as to matters of
strictly local concern.' 5 The district court concluded that the cable
television business was not of a strictly local nature and was there-
fore beyond home rule authority because it encompassed a wide
area of concerns including interstate commerce and the first
amendment freedoms of communicators.' 6 After considering City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.,' the district court
also held that the City was subject to antitrust liability because the
state action exemption set forth in Parker's was wholly inapplica-
11. Id. The city was concerned that CCC might become a natural monopoly. Id. at 837
n.6.
12. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 485 F. Supp. 1035 (D. Colo.),
rev'd, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980), rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
13. Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 makes unlawful
"[elvery contract, combination... or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States .... Id. § 1. CCC also alleged that the City of Boulder and BCC had
entered into a conspiracy to restrict competition by attempting to replace CCC with BCC.
102 S. Ct. at 837 n.9.
14. 317 U.S. 341 (1943). In Parker, a marketing program for the 1940 raisin crop,
adopted pursuant to the California Agricultural Prorate Act, was determined to derive its
authority from the legislative command of the state and thus was not in violation of the
Sherman Act. Parker interpreted the Sherman Act to be inapplicable to actions by a state
or to official action directed by a state. Id. at 350-51.
15. 102 S. Ct. at 838. See 485 F. Supp. at 1038-39.
16. 102 S. Ct. at 838. See 485 F.- Supp. at 1038-39.
17. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). In Lafayette, petitioner cities which owned and operated elec-
tric utility systems brought an action against a privately owned facility for antitrust viola-
tions. When defendants counterclaimed that the petitioners had committed various anti-
trust violations, petitioner cities claimed immunity under the Parker "state action doctrine"
because of their status as "cities." The Court held that no intent of Congress could be in-
ferred from the Sherman Act to grant cities immunity from antitrust liability. Id. at 398-
400.
18. 317 U.S. at 350-51. Parker held that the state acting in its sovereign capacity could
1983
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ble. Accordingly, CCC's motion for a preliminary injunction was
granted. 19
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit reversed.2 0 After concluding that the grant of authority to
Boulder as a home rule municipality under Colorado law gave the
City supremacy over local matters, the court of appeals found that,
pursuant to case law in the state, regulation of the cable television
industry was a local matter.21 The Tenth Circuit disagreed with
the lower court's application of Parker, as refined by Lafayette,
because the City of Boulder had a governmental interest at stake
rather than a proprietary interest of the type denied exemption in
Lafayette." Because Boulder's regulation represented the only ac-
tive governmental supervision and was the only expression of pol-
icy regarding the subject matter, the court of appeals held that the
requirements for a Parker exemption had been met.'
3
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,2" and re-
versed, holding that the City could be liable for antitrust violations
because it did not qualify for the Parker state action exemption.
Justice Brennan, writing for the majority, 6 stated that the ques-
act in restraint of trade without violating the federal antitrust laws. Id. See supra note 14.
19. 102 S. Ct. at 838-39. See 485 F. Supp. at 1040. The district court concluded the
plaintiff should be protected:
[I]n the exercise of the lawful rights which it had prior to the conduct which in rea-
sonable probability will be declared to be unlawful under the antitrust laws. In con-
sidering the public interest and how it may be effected by this injunction, it is neces-
sary to look beyond Boulder to the national policy of protecting free market
competition.
Id. The district court enjoined the City and its agents, "from taking any unilateral action to
restrict, limit, or revoke the authority of the plaintiff to conduct its cable television business
in the City of Boulder." Id. at 1041.
20. Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 630 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1980),
rev'd, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
21. 630 F.2d at 707.
22. 102 S. Ct. at 839. The court of appeals concluded that even if the criterion of
Lafayette were applicable - that a city was exempt from antitrust liability under Parker
only if the action in question was directed or authorized by a state in furtherance of a policy
to displace competition - Boulder had met that standard by its status as a home rule
municipality. 630 F.2d at 707-08.
23. 102 S. Ct. at 839. A dissenting opinion was filed by Chief Judge Markey who ar-
gued that the majority had overstated the sovereign absorption of the home rule municipal-
ity from the State of Colorado and maintained that the Parker state action exemption
should not apply. 630 F.2d at 709. (Markey, C.J., dissenting).
24. 450 U.S. 1039 (1981).
25. Communty Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
26. Id. at 836. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens joined Justice Bren-
nan's opinion. Justice Stevens also filed a separate concurring opinion, and Justice Rehn-
quist filed a dissenting opinion in which Chief Justice Burger and Justice O'Connor joined.
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tion presented in Parker was whether a state exercising its sover-
eign power was prohibited from imposing anti-competitive re-
straints under the federal antitrust laws. 7 Because the marketing
program in Parker2 8 derived its authority from the legislative ac-
tion of the state, it was held to be exempt from antitrust attack
under the Sherman Act because the federal antitrust legislation
was not intended to apply to state actions.2 Justice Brennan noted
that whether that exemption should be extended to municipalities
was considered in Lafayette, where petitioner cities licensed to op-
erate electric utility systems within and outside the municipality
were charged with antitrust violations. 0
The Court explained that in Lafayette it had rejected the argu-
ment that Congress had intended to exempt local governments
from antitrust liability.3' The Lafayette plurality, the Court noted,
held that a blanket exemption did not exist for all government ac-
tion merely because of the status of the empowering entity.3 2 Rely-
ing on precedent, the Lafayette Court concluded that built into
the Parker exemption is a principle of federalism - that this
country is made up of sovereign states, not sovereign subdivisions
of states.33 States could, however, in the exercise of their sovereign
Id. at 845. Justice White did not take part in the consideration or decision of this case. Id.
at 844.
27. Id. at 839.
28. See supra note 14.
29. 102 S. Ct. at 839. The Court in Parker stated: "In a dual system of government in
which, under the Constitution, the states are sovereign, save only as Congress may constitu-
tionally subtract from their authority, an unexpressed purpose to nullify a state's control
over its officers and agents is not lightly to be attributed to Congress." Parker, 317 U.S. at
351.
30. 102 S. Ct. at 839. See supra note 17.
31. 102 S. Ct. at 840.
32. Id. See Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978). See
also Bates v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) (ban on lawyer advertising set down
in disciplinary code of the Arizona Supreme Court held exempt from Sherman Act treat-
ment because the supreme court exercised the State's ultimate authority over lawyers and
thus restraint was compelled by the State as sovereign); Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 421
U.S. 773 (1975) (minimum fee schedule for lawyers approved by state bar association held
not to be sufficiently compelled by the State so as to qualify for Sherman Act exemption).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 840. The Court observed:
Cities are not themselves sovereign; they do not receive all the federal deference of
the States that create them. Parker's limitation of the exemption to 'official action
directed by a state.' is consistent with the fact that the States' subdivisions generally
have not been treated as equivalents of the States themselves. In light of the serious
economic dislocation which could result if cities were free to place their own parochial
interests above the Nation's economic goals reflected in the antitrust laws, we are
especially unwilling to presume that Congress intended to exclude anticompetitive
municipal action from their reach.
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power, absolve municipal actions from antitrust liability by ex-
pressly authorizing a municipality to engage in activities in fur-
therance of a state policy to displace competition with regulation
or monopoly public service."' However, such state policy must be
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed. 5
Justice Brennan explained that Boulder's conduct would be eli-
gible for the state action exemption only if it met one of two crite-
ria: (1) that the ordinance was an act of the State of Colorado itself
exercising its sovereign power, i.e., Parker; or (2) that the ordi-
nance represented municipal conduct in furtherance or implemen-
tation of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state pol-
icy pursuant to Lafayette, New Motor Vehicle Board v. Orrin W.
Fox Co.,3 ' and California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.
87
Boulder claimed that Colorado has vested it with sovereign pow-
ers in local and municipal affairs by permitting its establishment
as a home rule municipality, thus transforming Boulder's regula-
tion of cable television - an otherwise local matter - into a sov-
ereign act of the state.38 Boulder asserted that its moratorium ordi-
nance was a governmental act, performed by Boulder acting as the
State in local matters.39 Justice Brennan rejected the City's claims
on the theory that the Parker state action exemption incorporates
the intent of Congress under the Sherman Act to reflect a dual
federalism principle which acknowledges a degree of sovereignty in
Id. at 840 (quoting Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 412-13).
34. 102 S. Ct. at 840. The Lafayette Court concluded that the Parker doctrine would
shield municipal conduct from antitrust liability here engaged in "pursuant to state policy
to displace competition with regulation or monopoly public service." 435 U.S. at 413. Justice
Brennan recognized that states frequently effectuate their policies through instrumentalities
of their cities and towns. 102 S. Ct. at 840.
35. 102 S. Ct. at 840. Justice Brennan noted that this standard has since been adopted
by a majority of the Court. See California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum,
Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980) (state wine-pricing scheme found not exempt under Parker even
though part of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, because scheme
was not actively supervised by state); New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S.
96 (1978) (state act requiring motor vehicle manufacturer to get approval of state regulatory
agency before it could open dealership within existing challenging franchisee's market deter-
mined to be outside the Sherman Act since the regulatory scheme was clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed).
36. 439 U.S. 96 (1978).
37. 445 U.S. 97 (1980). See supra note 35.
38. 102 S. Ct. at 841. Boulder contended that this delegation of home rule powers




the state but not in cities.'0 The Court observed that United
States v. Kagama4' held that cities are not sovereign and must de-
rive their power from the states. 4 Justice Brennan asserted that
this principle was adopted in Parker and reaffirmed in Lafayette,
Fox, and Midcal.4s Lafayette expressly recognized that municipali-
ties are not themselves sovereign and that they could be eligible
for the state action exemption only to the extent that they acted in
furtherance of a clearly expressed and affirmatively articulated
state policy."
The Court next addressed Boulder's claim that Colorado's home
rule amendment granting the City automony fulfilled the require-
ment of clear articulation and affirmative expression of a state pol-
icy.' 5 Justice Brennan rejected this contention reasoning that Colo-
rado, by allowing the City to regulate the cable industry, had not
"contemplated" that the City would enact an anticompetitive pro-
gram. 4' Rather, the State had not expressed any opinion at all re-
garding Boulder's anticompetitive ordinance. Justice Brennan
found that a broad grant of authority by the state to regulate in an
area could not properly be said to satisfy the "clear articulation"
standard because one locality could regulate in a certain way while
another could choose not to regulate at all.47 Such divergent ac-
tions could not both be said to be "contemplated" by the state.
Justice Brennan explained acceptance of such a position would al-
most certainly eviscerate the meaning of clear articulation and af-
40. Id.
41. 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
42. 102 S. Ct. at 842. The Boulder Court maintained that sovereignty in the United
States can rest either with the federal government or with the single states. As stated in
Kagama: "There exist within the broad domain of sovereignty but these two. There may be
cities, counties, and other organized bodies with limited legislative functions, but they are
all derived from, or exist in, subordination to one or the other of these." 118 U.S. at 379. See
102 S. Ct. at 842.
43. 102 S. Ct. at 842.
44. Lafayette, 435 U.S. at 413. Alternatively, Boulder had claimed that in accordance
with Chief Justice Burger's concurrence in Lafayette, its actions were clearly justified as a
governmental rather than a proprietary interest. 102 S. Ct. at 842 n.18.
45. 102 S. Ct. at 842. The Court found that the requirement of "clear articulation and
affirmative expression" could not be satisfied when the State's position was only neutral
regarding the challenged municipal restraint. Id. at 843. If a State allows its municipalities
free rein they can hardly be said to have "contemplated" any specific anticompetitive re-
straint. Id. Nor could these: "[A~ctions be truly described as 'comprehended within the pow-
ers granted,' since the term, 'granted,' necessarily implies an affirmative addressing of the
subject by the State. The State did not do so here: The relationship of the State of Colorado
to Boulder's moratorium ordinance is one of precise neutrality." Id.
46. Id. at 842.
47. Id. at 843.
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firmative expression that prior case law demands must be attached
to the phrase.48
The Court next considered Boulder's argument that a denial of a
Parker exemption would have an adverse effect on cities and un-
duly burden the federal courts.49 Justice Brennan rejected these
contentions, stressing the policy of free markets and open competi-
tion underlying the antitrust laws.50 The Court concluded that if a
state, which is exempt from antitrust laws under Parker, does not
directly authorize a district or municipality to act in a certain
manner, then the district or municipality must follow the antitrust
regulations."' Justice Brennan concluded that the decision of the
court of appeals that the requirements of a Parker exemption had
been met should be reversed and remanded.
52
Justice Stevens, in a concurring opinion, 3 made it clear that
simply because the Court had not found an exemption for Boulder
under the Parker doctrine, it did not mean that Boulder had vio-
lated the antitrust laws, an assumption he believed to be implicit
in the dissenting opinion. 54 According to Justice Stevens, the rea-
sons for denying an exemption for municipalities in the Lafayette
case were equally applicable to the instant case regardless of Boul-
der's home rule status. In neither case did the Court determine
that the Sherman Act had been violated; exemption and violation
were two separate and distinct issues.8 8
Justice Stevens explained the distinction between exemption
from the antitrust laws and violation of them by reference to Can-
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. On this point, the Court emphasized:
Antitrust laws in general, and the Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna
Carta of free enterprise. They are as important as the preservation of economic free-
dom and our free-enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is to the protection of our
fundamental personal freedoms. And the freedom guaranteed each and every busi-
ness, no matter how small, is the freedom to compete - to assert with vigor, imagina-
tion, devotion, and ingenuity whatever economic muscle it can muster.
Id. at 843 n.19 (quoting United States v. Topco Assoc., 405 U.S. 596, 610 (1972)).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 843-44. The federal antitrust laws which impose sanctions on persons
for illegal acts apply as well to municipalities. Id. at 843. The Court specifically did not
examine the question of liability for private persons performing similar acts since the in-
stant case did not so demand. In addition, the problem of remedies against municipalities
was not examined. Id. n.20.
52. Id. at 844.





tor v. Detroit Edison Co., 56 in which the Supreme Court held that
the Parker exemption was inapplicable to the tariff actions of De-
troit Edison Company as approved by the Michigan Public Utility
Commission. Although the suit was allowed to go forward, the
Court did not determine that the members of the Michigan Public
Utility Commission had become parties to an antitrust violation.
57
Justice Stevens stressed that on the contrary, the plurality in Can-
tor had emphasized the difference between a charge that public
officials had violated the Sherman Act and a charge that private
parties had done so.
58
Justice Stevens maintained that any inquiry into whether an ac-
tual violation of the antitrust laws had occurred was a question of
fact and law which must first be addressed by the district court."
He suggested that the violation issue had to be decided on a case-
by-case basis and would prove more complex than the dissenting
opinion implied. 60
Justice Rehnquist, in a dissenting opinion, 1 disagreed with the
Court's decision on two grounds. First, he challenged the Court's
application of the "state action" exemption to the case, maintain-
ing that a preemption analysis should be used instead for deter-
mining the impact of Parker on this case.62 Justice Rehnquist
claimed that the real issue in Parker and in the instant case was
not whether the actions of state and municipal governments are
exempt from the Sherman Act treatment but whether those ac-
tions are preempted by the Sherman Act under the supremacy
clause of the United States Constitution and the very principle of
federalism itself.6" Secondly, he charged that the Court treated a
local governmental entity identically to any private business." He
argued that as he read the Court's opinion, a municipality may vio-
late the antitrust laws by enacting legislation in conflict with the
Sherman Act, unless the ordinance is enacted pursuant to an af-
56. 428 U.S. 579 (1976). In Cantor, the Michigan Public Utility Commission had ap-
proved a tariff which allowed Detroit Edison to distribute free light bulbs to its customers.
Because the distribution was approved by an entity of the State, the lower court determined
that the company qualified for the Parker exemption. Id. at 581.
57. 102 S. Ct. at 844 (Stevens, J., concurring).
58. Id. See 428 U.S. at 585-92.
59. 102 S. Ct. at 845 (Stevens, J., concurring).
60. Id.
61. Id. (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist was joined by Chief Justice Bur-






firmative state policy to suppress competitive market forces."
Justice Rehnquist explained that preemption and exemption are
distinct concepts. Preemption analysis is invoked when conflict oc-
curs between legislative enactments of two sovereigns - one fed-
eral and one state. 60 Questions under the supremacy clause"7 arise
when either the actions of both sovereigns conflict or where the
federal government has exclusively occupied a particular legislative
field precluding any state action." When the Court finds preemp-
tion, the state enactment must be struck without consideration of
the state's purposes.a9 Justice Rehnquist further explained that ex-
emption,, on the other hand, involves the interplay between the en-
actments of only one sovereign and whether one enactment was
intended to relieve a party of the necessity of complying with a
prior one.70 Exemption analysis requires the reconciling of two
schemes while preemption analysis requires that one legislative
scheme be discarded. According to Justice Rehnquist, a preemp-
tion analysis was much more applicable to a state action question
since the core of the case involves alleged conflict between state or
local legislative action and the Sherman Act.
According to Justice Rehnquist, the Parker Court had found
that the challenged state regulation which attempted to maintain
65. Id.
66. Id. Justice Rehnquist stated:
We are confronted with questions under the Supremacy Clause when we are called
upon to resolve a reported conflict between the enactments of the federal government
and those of a State or local government, or where it is claimed that the federal
government has occupied a particular field exclusively, so as to foreclose any state
regulation.
Id. at 845-46.
67. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, § 2. The supremacy clause provides that the Constitution and
the laws made in pursuance thereof and the treaties made by the United States, "shall be
the Supreme Law of the Land." Id.
68. 102 S. Ct. at 845-46 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
69. Id. at 846 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting). Justice Rehnquist stated that because of the
sensitive area of federal-state relations, courts are "reluctant to infer preemption," the pre-
sumption being against preemption absent a clearly expressed intention by Congress to su-
persede the power of the states. Id. (quoting Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117,
132 (1978)). See Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
70. 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that no
problems of federalism exist with only one sovereign. A court must merely ascertain con-
gressional intent as to whether the exemption is express or implied. Id. See National Broiler
Mktg. Ass'n. v. United States, 436 U.S. 816 (1978) (Sherman Act and the Capper-Volstead
Act); United States v. Philadelphia Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963) (Clayton Act and the
federal Bank Merger Act of 1960); Silver v. New York Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963)
(Sherman Act and the Securities Exchange Act).
71. 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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prices for the California raisin crop at an artifically high level
would have violated the Sherman Act if it had been instituted by
an agreement between private persons. 72 The Parker Court as-
sumed that Congress could prevent a state from establishing such
a stabilization program because of its effects on interstate com-
merce by occupying the field itself7 3 Justice Rehnquist further
noted, however, that the Parker Court found nothing in the Sher-
man Act which indicated that it applied to the states or its agents,
and that any attempt to interfere with the control of a state over
its officers or agents should not be lightly attributed to Congress. 4
To Justice Rehnquist, the reasoning employed by the Court in
Parker was clearly one of preemption under the supremacy clause
rather than exemption. The Court in Parker held that Congress
did not intend by the Sherman Act to overrule state control of the
economy, even though such action would violate the Sherman Act
if engaged in by private persons.7
Citing the two state action cases ruled on by the Court prior to
Boulder - Fox and Midcal - Justice Rehnquist maintained that
both more accurately involved preemption rather than exemption
analysis.7 6 In the Fox case, the Court held that a practice author-
ized by an act of the California legislature which interfered with
the establishment of car dealerships was not subject to the Sher-
man Act because it represented a clearly articulated and affirma-
tively expressed policy to displace competition. 7 In addition, the
Fox Court determined that the possible anticompetitive effect of a
state statute was not enough to invalidate it under the Sherman
Act because the power of the states to regulate the economy would
be nullified, thus allowing a state statute to survive in spite of pos-
sible conflict with the Sherman Act.
78
In Midcal, the Court determined that California's wine-pricing
system constituted resale price maintenance and was a per se vio-
72. Id. See supra note 14.
73. 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Parker, 317 U.S. at 350-51.
74. 102 S. Ct. at 846 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Parker, 317 U.S: at 350-51.
75. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist noted that some
state regulations may be preempted by the Sherman Act since a state "does not give immu-
nity to those who violate the Sherman Act by authorizing them to violate it, or by declaring
that their action is lawful." Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 351 (1943)).
76. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See supra note 35.
77. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin
W. Fox, Co., 439 U.S. 96, 109 (1978).
78. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Fox, 439 U.S. at 111.
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lation of the Sherman Act.7 9 The system could not qualify for
Parker treatment, Justice Rehnquist explained, because even
though it was directed by a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy, the system was not actively supervised by
the state.8
Justice Rehnquist maintained that in Parker, Midcal, and Fox,
the Court reached the conclusion that a state statute is unenforce-
able because it was preempted by the Sherman Act, thus avoiding
any question of violation of the antitrust laws by an action of the
state.81 He noted that unlike Boulder, these cases had involved
challenges to a state statute.8 Justice Rehnquist accused the ma-
jority of determining that a municipality may actually violate the
antitrust laws when it merely enacts an ordinace invalid under the
Sherman Act, and when the ordinance cannot be saved by being an
affirmative expression of state policy or that it is acting as the in-
strumentality of the state. 3
According to Justice Rehnquist, applying Parker in such a way
will cause many problems for the courts, including whether per se
rules of illegality should be applied to local governments on the
same basis as private defendants, whether municipalities may be
liable for treble damages for antitrust violations,84 and under what
circumstances the rule of reason 85 should be applied to municipal
restraints."
As a vehicle for examining the implications of applying the rule
of reason to municipal activity, Justice Rehnquist characterized
the analysis in National Society of Professional Engineers v.
United States87 as determining two categories of possible defenses
79. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See California Retail Liquor Dealer's
Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 102-03 (1980).
80. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Midcal, 445 U.S. at 105-06.
81. 102 S. Ct. at 847 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 847-48 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
84. Id. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), which requires
"[any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything forbid-
den in the antitrust laws may sue therefore. . . and shall recover threefold the damages by
him sustained, and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." Id.
85. The rule of reason originated in antitrust law in the landmark case of Standard Oil
Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). The Court's decision, authored by Chief Justice
White, condemned the holding company which monopolized the Nation's oil refining busi-
ness and concluded that only those restrictions which were unreasonable would be consid-
ered violations of the Sherman Act. Id. at 59-61.
86. 102 S. Ct. at 848 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
87. 435 U.S. 679 (1978). The test for the rule of reason employed in Professional Engi-
neers is whether the challenged policy or agreement promotes or suppresses competition.
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of private parties to potential antitrust violations. Under the anal-
ysis, either a restraint is supportable because it is not an unreason-
able restraint of trade or because its procompetitive effects out-
weigh its anticompetitive effects."8
Applying Professional Engineers to municipalities, Justice
Rehnquist found that a challenged restraint could not be saved be-
cause its benefits to the community outweighed its anticompetitive
effects.89 Regardless of the best interests of the inhabitants, any
anticompetitive effect of a municipal regulation under this analysis
would invalidate it.90 Justice Rehnquist stressed, however, that
competition cannot and does not further the interests that lie be-
hind most social welfare legislation.91 He indicated that although
state or local enactments are not invalidated by the Sherman Act
simply because of anticompetitive effects, the Court has invali-
dated them on the basis that such a program would violate the
antitrust laws if engaged in by private parties."2 Absent an affirma-
tively expressed state policy to displace competition to support its
regulation, the municipality would violate the Sherman Act if the
regulation was not procompetitive. Justice Rehnquist charged that
the ability of the municipality to regulate the economy would
therefore be nullified.93
Justice Rehnquist found, however, that if the analysis of Profes-
sional Engineers was not applied strictly and an exemption was
carved out allowing municipalities to justify a regulation if its so-
cial good outweighed its anticompetitive effect, the Court would be
called upon to conduct a wholesale review of social legislation in
the same manner as in the Lochner era.94 Rehnquist charged that
More succinctly, the test is "[w]hether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even destroy
competition." Id. at 691 (quoting Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231, 238
(1917)).




92. Id. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist emphasized two recent
cases determined by the Supreme Court to involve resale price maintenance. See California
Retail Liquor Dealers Ass'n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980), and Schwegmann
Bros. v. Calvert Distillers Corp., 341 U.S. 384 (1951).
93. 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
94. Id. He stated, "[i]nstead of liberty of contract and substantive due process, the
pro-competitive principles of the Sherman Act will be the governing standard by which the
reasonableness of all local regulation will be determined." Id. With its decision in Lochner v.
New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), invalidating regulation of hours of labor, the Supreme Court
inaugurated three decades of judicial control over legislative enactments of the Congress
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the Sherman Act should not be used to authorize a federal court to
impose its will on local legislators' regulation of the economy."
Justice Rehnquist further maintained that all of these problems
could have been avoided had the Court used a preemption rather
than exemption analysis."6 Under the preemption analysis, the
same process could be used to invalidate a municipal ordinance
that is used to invalidate a state statute. Thus, an ordinance would
survive if it met an adjusted Midcal test: the regulatory scheme
must have been enacted due to an affirmative policy of the munici-
pality to displace competition and be actively supervised and im-
plemented by the municipality.
7
Justice Rehnquist also criticized the Court for its conclusion that
federalism is not affected when a municipal ordinance is invali-
dated by the Sherman Act.'" He stated that federalism is impli-
cated in the same degree when a municipal ordinance is invali-
dated as when a state statute is struck down. According to Justice
Rehnquist, the majority premised its opinion on the theory that
because municipalities are not states, they are not sovereign, and
federalism is not implicated when federal law is used to invalidate
a constitutionally valid municipal ordinance." By contrast, Justice
Rehnquist maintained that notions of federalism are implicated
when a municipal ordinance is preempted by a federal statute.100
No such distinction has been made by the Court regarding states
and their subdivisions concerning the preemption effect of federal
law.' 0' Rather, he argued, the standards applied by the Court are
the same whether the action is taken by the state or by one of its
subdivisions.0 2 The Court, in Justice Rehnquist's estimation, could
not have wanted to completely alter established supremacy clause
and the states regulating the economy which interferred with contract and property rights.
W. LOCKHART, Y. KAMISAR, & J. CHOPER, THE AmmcA CONSTITUTION 263 (1981). Justice
Rehnquist feared that were the application of the rule of reason set forth in Professional
Engineers modified to allow municipalities to save anticompetitive legislation on the basis
of benefit to the community, the Court would be forced to "engage in the same wide-rang-
ing, essentially standardless inquiry into the reasonableness of local regulation that this
Court has properly rejected." 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
95. 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). See Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S. 726
(1963).
96. 102 S. Ct. at 849 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).





102. Id. See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
Huron Portland Cement Co. v. Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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analysis, even though in effect it had done so by allowing a munici-
pality to invoke Parker immunity only to the same extent as a pri-
vate litigant. 103 A better application of Parker would provide for
similar treatment of municipal regulations and state regulations.
1 0 4
Using a preemption rather than an exemption analysis, Justice
Rehnquist urged, no principled basis can be used to support differ-
ent treatment for cities and states. 0
Justice Rehnquist stated that the Parker doctrine should be ap-
plied to determine whether a municipal action is preempted by the
Sherman Act; as with a state, a municipality should not be hauled
into federal court to justify its decision to displace competition
with regulation. 10 6 A correct application of Parker, according to
Justice Rehnquist, would determine that the protection awarded
by the federal government to promote free trade and competition
is not compromised if the state or local regulation is clearly an act
of government in furtherance of the interests of its citizens, not
private parties, to displace competition with regulation. 07 By plac-
ing the municipality on the same footing as a private litigant, Jus-
tice Rehnquist charged that the Court would severely alter the re-
lationship between states and their subdivisions.10  Justice
Rehnquist feared that absent a specific state authorization, a mu-
nicipality will no longer be free to regulate the local economy. 109
According to Justice Rehnquist, the decision of the Court rings
the death knell for the home rule movement, effectively eviscerat-
ing the local autonomy municipalities have gained throughout past
decades." 0 In areas where the state is prevented from enacting leg-
islation on local matters, the municipality will now be defenseless
to antitrust challenges to its regulation of the economy because the
state will be prevented from authorizing such municipal activity."'
In Justice Rehnquist's view, the only way to counteract such an
effect and permit municipalities to legislate on local matters would
be to dramatically alter the relationship between the state and its





108. Id. at 850-51 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
109. Id. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
110. Id. Justice Rehnquist noted that the municipalities standing to lose the most by




subdivisions.' 12 To regain its power without antitrust liability, mu-
nicipalities would be forced to cede back their authority to the
state. By its decision, Justice Rehnquist argued, the Court had not
only erroneously determined that federalism is not implicated
when a municipal ordinance is invalidated by a federal statute, it
had used the Sherman Act to regulate the very relationship be-
tween states and their political subdivisions."
In 1890 Congress passed the Sherman Act," pursuant to the
power granted to it by the commerce clause, to prevent unreasona-
ble restraints of trade among persons in interstate and foreign
commerce. The Sherman Act itself does not specifically address
whether the actions of a state or municipality in restraint of trade
should be likewise prohibited.1 5
The applicability of the Sherman Act to state functions was first
considered by the Court in 1943 in Parker v. Brown,"6 where suit
was brought by a producer and packer of raisins in California to
enjoin the state from enforcing its prorate marketing program. The
controversy in Parker revolved around whether the California Ag-
ricultural Prorate Act, which allowed state officials to restrict the
industry, violated the federal antitrust laws. The Supreme Court
held that the program was specifically authorized and commanded
by the State, and because the Court could find no prohibition
against state action under the Sherman Act, the Court upheld the
state statute.11 7 The Parker Court could not be persuaded to find
that Congress intended to include states in the class of persons
prohibited from acting in restraint of trade. According to the
Court, the purpose of the Sherman Act was to prevent business
combinations and because there was no such danger in the instant
case, the provisions of the Act did not apply to invalidate the state
legislation."' The Parker decision specifically did not consider the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Pub. L. No. 93-528, 88 Stat. 1708 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7
(1976)). See supra note 13. Section 2 of the Sherman Act makes it unlawful to "monopolize,
or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons, to mo-
nopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States." 15 U.S.C. § 2.
115. See Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 350-52. The Court reasoned that in our dual system of government, states
are sovereign, and except as Congress may subtract from their authority, an unexpressed
purpose to nullify a state's control over its officers and agents is not likely to be attributed
to Congress. The Sherman Act gives no indication that it intended to restrain state action or
official action directed by a state. Id. at 350-51.
118. Id. at 351. The Court stated:
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problem of a state or a municipality participating in a private
agreement in restraint of trade, leaving open the matter of the lia-
bility of states and municipalities as co-conspirators.11 9
Not until Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar'" 0 in 1975 did the Su-
preme Court again consider the state action exemption enunciated
in Parker. In Goldfarb, a class action suit was brought by a Vir-
ginia couple against the state bar association when they could not
find a lawyer to perform a title search and to issue title insurance,
necessary for the purchase of a house, for less than the fee set by
the state bar association.M The Supreme Court held that although
the association's action constituted price fixing under the Sherman
Act and although the state supreme court had ultimate control
over the unethical practices of the legal profession, there still ex-
isted insufficient specific state direction for the state action exemp-
tion to apply. The test for immunity established under Goldfarb
was whether the questioned action was compelled by the state act-
ing in its sovereign capacity.'
22
The following year, the state action exemption was again con-
fronted in Cantor v. Detroit Edison Co.' 2 Detroit Edison's prac-
tice of distributing free light bulbs to its customers, which was ap-
proved by the Michigan Public Utility Commission, was held to
involve insufficient state action to qualify for the Parker exemp-
tion.'2 4 Because the commission had merely approved the public
utility's rate schedule and practice, no direct action by the State
was involved and thus no immunity attached. The Court found
that mere supervision by a state regulatory body of a private util-
ity was insufficient to trigger theParker exemption.12 5 Detroit
Edison was subsequently held accountable under the federal anti-
Here the state command to the Commission and to the program committee of the
California Prorate Act is not rendered unlawful by the Sherman Act since, in view of
the latter's words and history, it must be taken to be a prohibition of individual and
not state action. It is the state which has created the machinery for establishing the
prorate program.
Id. at 352.
119. Id. at 351-52. For a thorough discussion of the development of state action ex-
emption under Parker as it applies to municipalities, see Note, Antitrust Law and Munici-
pal Corporations: Are Municipalities Exempt From Sherman Act Coverage Under the
Parker Doctrine?, 65 GEo. L.J. 1547 (1977).
120. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
121. Id. at 775-76.
122. Id. at 790.
123. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
124. Id. at 590-91.




In Bates v. State Bar of Arizona,2 the Supreme Court granted
antitrust immunity to the state bar on the grounds that its activity
was specifically mandated by the disciplinary code of the Arizona
Supreme Court, which derived its authority from the state consti-
tution. 2 7 Bates sought to invalidate the disciplinary rules of the
legal profession, which prohibited attorneys from advertising in
newspapers or other media, as inhibiting competition. 28 A differ-
ent result had ensued in Goldfarb, according to the Bates Court,
because the rigid fixed-price schedule was not specifically directed
by the state supreme court. 29 The disciplinary action in the Bates
case was an affirmative command of the Arizona Supreme Court
and thus met the threshold test of being compelled by direction of
the state as sovereign.
130
The Supreme Court tooks its initial look at whether municipali-
ties could be immune from liability under the Sherman Act in City
of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co.' 3' In Lafayette, two
Louisiana cities that owned and operated electric utility systems
were found liable for alleged antitrust abuses. A plurality of the
Court determined that antitrust immunity should be granted to a
municipality only if the challenged conduct passed the threshold
test: a state policy specifically authorizing a displacement of com-
petition which was clearly articulated and affirmatively ex-
pressed.'32 The very narrow holding on which five Justices agreed
was a negative one - that there was no automatic immunity for
cities as the defendants had claimed. 33 Chief Justice Burger, in a
concurring opinion, agreed with the other four Justices that the
Lousiana cities should not be granted immunity because they were
exercising a proprietary interest in the operation of the utilities,
126. 433 U.S. 350 (1977).
127. Id. at 360.
128. Id. at 356.
129. Id. at 359.
130. Id. at 360.
131. 435 U.S. 389 (1978).
132. Id. at 410. See generally 59 DEN. L.J. 399 (1982).
133. 435 U.S. at 408-13. Justice Brennan, writing in that part of the opinion in which
all five justices agreed, said that municipalities acting as providers are in a position to affect
the allocation of resources so as to alter our cherished system of free trade and open compe-
tition protected by the antitrust laws. Justice Brennan feared that should municipalities be
allowed to regulate the local economy solely on the basis of their parochial interests without
being subject to antitrust liability, the procompetitive policy established by the Congress
would be undermined. Id. at 408, 413.
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not a governmental one.134
Justice Stewart, in a dissenting opinion in Lafayette, argued
that because a city only operates through the power that is dele-
gated to it by the state, it acts as a subdivision of the state and
should carry the same immunity.1 5 According to justice Stewart,
in such a case no requirement of state compulsion need be satisfied
because the state itself is acting. Justice Stewart feared that the
Court's decision in Lafayette could have a disastrous effect on the
governing of local matters by a municipality. A city might be
forced to have a state statute passed specifically authorizing its an-
ticompetitive conduct if it were to escape antitrust liability.3 6 Jus-
tice Stewart urged that the requirements of the Parker exemption
should be met when the state itself was acting through one of its
political subdivisions, and that no further state compulsion was
necessary.13 7 Justice Stewart was particularly sensitive to the stag-
gering costs the municipality would incur if it were forced to seek
specific state authorization for any acts which might be considered
anticompetitive. 3 8 Further, Justice Stewart found that exposing
municipal governments to treble damages could cripple their
effectiveness.' 39
In its next case involving the state action exemption, California
Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,
e40
the Court applied a two-fold test, based on the Lafayette decision,
for determining antitrust immunity. Midcal considered the ques-
134. Id. at 418 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part and in the judgment).
135. Id. at 429 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
136. Id. at 438 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice Stewart emphasized that under our
federal system, states are generally free to allocate their power amongst their political subdi-
visions as they wish, even to the extent of allowing a municipality to exercise its police
power without obtaining approval for each new action. Such freedom of self-government by
a municipality permits the state legislators to legislate on state-wide matters rather than
strictly local concerns while it permits the local governments to deal promptly and directly
with local matters. The decision of the majority, Justice Stewart lamented, would necessa-
rily lessen the extent to which a state could realistically allocate its power to autonomous
political subdivisions. Id. at 434-35 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
137. Id. at 433-34 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
138. Id. at 440 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
139. Id. If a challenged restraint were declared to be in violation of the antitrust laws
and a treble damage award lodged against a municipality, the dissent charged, the citizens
would bear the brunt of such an award in the form of increased taxes and decreased ser-
vices. Justice Stewart charged: "The prospect of a city closing its schools, discharging its
policemen, and curtailing its fire department in order to defend an antitrust suit would
surely dismay the Congress that enacted the Sherman Act." Id. at 441 (Stewart, J.,
dissenting).
140. 445 U.S. 97 (1980).
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tion of whether the wine pricing plan of the California Department
of Alcoholic Beverage Control violated the Sherman Act. The two-
fold test set forth by the Court was that the policy must be (1)
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed as state policy, and
(2) actively supervised by the state itself."'
In Boulder, the Court applied the Midcal test to home rule mu-
nicipalities and found no special exemption was warranted. Ac-
cording to the Court, the home rule municipality of Boulder, seek-
ing to regulate the cable television industry within its immediate
jurisdiction, failed to be eligible for the Parker exemption because
it did not meet even the first requirement of the Midcal standard.
The threshold test for immunity applied in Boulder was whether
the challenged restraint constituted an action of the state in its
sovereign capacity, or in furtherance or implementation of a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace
competition. This standard corresponded to the first prong of the
Midcal test.1 42 Since the Court found that Boulder had not satis-
fied the first part of this test, it did not consider the second prong
which provides that the challenged restraint also must be actively
supervised by the state.
In finding that the first Midcal requirement was not met, the
Boulder Court erred by failing to recognize the special status that
a home rule municipality requires in our present-day governmental
structure. The State of Colorado, by virtue of the Home Rule
Amendment to the Colorado Constitution,1 43 had ceded its author-
ity to act concerning local affairs to the City of Boulder. The pur-
pose of the home rule movement in the United States was to free
municipalities from the control of the state legislature - to allow
municipalities to act on matters of strictly local concern without
seeking specific authorization from the state governments.1 44 Si-
lence on the part of the state on matters of local concern was to be
expected after the initial grant of home rule status.1 4 5 Thus, mu-
nicipal action in an antitrust context should be viewed as a state
141. Id. at 104-05 (quoting New Motor Vehicle Bd. v. Orrin W. Fox Co., 439 U.S. 96,
109 (1978)).
142. See City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. at 841.
143. COLO. CONST. art. XX, § 6. See supra note 1.
144. Vanlandingham, Municipal Home Rule in the United States, 10 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 269, 270 (1968). See National Institute of Municipal Law Officers' Amicus Curiae Brief
for Respondent at 6-7, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
145. National Institute of Municipal Law Officers' Amicus Curiae Brief for Respon-
dent at 7-10, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835 (1982).
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action and found to withstand the same requirements imposed
upon states for antitrust immunity. 4"
Under the state home rule amendment, the City of Boulder was
granted the full right of self-government in local matters; the laws
of the State of Colorado were to remain in effect except to the ex-
tent superseded by the valid acts of the home rule municipality.1
47
If an ordinance enacted by the City on a matter of strictly local
concern, for example a zoning ordinance, came into conflict with a
state statute, the controversy would be resolved in favor of the lo-
cal ordinance.' 48 Because the State had ceded its power to act in
local matters to the City, Boulder claimed that both requirements
set forth for immunity under the Lafayette-Midcal standard has
been met. The Boulder Court found that neither criteria was satis-
fied, 49 and refused to consider such a broad grant of authority by
the State to constitute an act of the State itself, therefore qualify-
ing the actions of a home rule municipality as the actions of the
State in its sovereign capacity.5 0
In addition to not recognizing the special status of home rule
municipalities, the Boulder Court also failed to distinguish Lafay-
ette. In Lafayette, the Court decided that the Parker state action
exemption from the antitrust laws did not automatically apply to
municipalities. 16' Lafayette is clearly distinguishable from Boulder
because the cities in Lafayette were not home rule municipalities
and the challenge against them was for operating an electric utility
- a proprietary rather than a governmental function. The City of
Boulder had no proprietary interest in regulating cable television
service in the area; there was no expected monetary gain to Boul-
der. Rather, the City of Boulder was exercising a governmental
function in attempting to provide the best possible service for its
citizens.
The Boulder Court could have respected the desire of the State
of Colorado to decentralize its functions, evidenced by the State's
grant of home rule to Boulder by extending the Parker state action
exemption to home rule municipalities. The spirit of that exemp-
146. Id.
147. CoLo. CONST. art. XX, § 6.
148. Id. See National Institute of Municipal Law Officers' Amicus Curiae Brief for
Respondent at 18, Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 102 S. Ct. 835
(1982).
149. 102 S. Ct. at 842-43.
150. Id. at 841-42.
151. City of Lafayette v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., 435 U.S. 389, 408 (1978). See
supra note 34.
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tion could have been retained. Since the State through an amend-
ment to its constitution had in effect made the municipality sover-
eign, the actions of the municipality could be considered to be the
actions of the State. The Boulder Court chose instead to decide
that a municipality is not using the state's power when it regulates
the local economy, absent a precise mandate from the state.
1 52
The effect this decision will have on the conduct of a home rule
municipality's affairs is that virtually all of its franchising, licens-
ing, and zoning actions may now be subjected to antitrust liabil-
ity, 53 severely hampering the municipality's local obligations. Lo-
cal home rule governments may now be subjected to numerous
lawsuits in an area in which they previously believed they were im-
mune. Taxpayers residing in these areas will be confronted with
the possibility of being assessed for treble damages in an award
against a disgruntled franchisee.
Boulder also leaves unsettled the extent to which a state may be
required to have authorized or directed a course of action to satisfy
the clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed standard of
Midcal. An action taken by the elected representatives of a state in
the people's best interest will be immune from antitrust liability.
The same action taken by the elected representatives of a munici-
pality will be subject to antitrust liability.'"4 Actions of a munici-
pality may benefit from the state's immunity only if its actions are
specifically directed or supervised by the state. 55
As Justice Rehnquist fears, Boulder may be the death knell for
152. See Freilich & Carlisle, The Community Communications Case: A Return to the
Dark Ages before Home Rule, 14 URa. LAw. v-xii (Spring 1982). Freilich and Carlisle chal-
lenge the very concept of federalism which Justice Brennan used to support his decision,
fearing that such a restrictive view of only two sovereign entities, federal and state, would
cause the demise of the home rule movement. Freilich and Carlisle stress that the federal
government has delegated sovereign powers while the states have reserved sovereign powers.
Id. at ix-x. According to Freilich and Carlisle:
.[T]rue federalism would recognize state rights and permit solutions to state problems
by whatever delegation of power the state deemed appropriate, including home rule.
Justice Brennan's federalism impinges on the manner in which states delegate au-
thority and creates vacuums of power preventing the solution to many of the state's
problems.
Id. at xi.
153. See T. Brunner, Municipal Antitrust Liability: Prospects After the Boulder Case,
Memorandum to U.S. Conference of Mayors (Jan. 25, 1982) (unpublished memorandum).
154. See S. Chapple, Antitrust Liability of Cities, Memorandum to United States Con-
ference of Mayors (Jan. 20, 1982) (unpublished memorandum).
155. T. Brunner, supra note 153, at 4. Brunner suggests that state legislatures may
immunize actions by municipalities or by semi-governmental bodies like property owners'
associations and professional organizations.
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the home rule movement. Those cities with the highest degree of
autonomy will be the ones with the most to lose.' 6e Constitutional
grants of sovereign authority apparently are insufficient to award
sovereign immunity. The freedom of the home rule municipality is




156. 102 S. Ct. at 851 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
157. Freilich & Carlisle, supra note 152, at vi. According to Freilich and Carlisle:
[If the spirit of this decision is extended Justice Rehnquist's predictions on the fu-
ture of home-rule will be realized and the century old home rule experiment, unique
to America, will be crippled or destroyed. Home rule municipalities will again have to
crawl back to the state legislature begging for handouts, an evil which was abolished
by state constitutional amendments prohibiting special legislation. The experimental
era, the Renaissance of entrusting a portion of the state's power with smaller and
responsive political entities, will be over and the dark ages before home rule was initi-
ated by Joseph Pulitizer will return.
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